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ABSTRACT 
The doctrine of implied repeals allows Congress to repeal 
existing legislation, without explicitly stating its intention to do so, 
through the enactment of new legislation. While there has always 
been a presumption against implied repeals, this presumption has 
essentially transformed into a hard-and-fast rule forbidding implicit 
repeals. Nowhere is this transformation more pronounced than 
where the claimed repeal rests solely on an appropriations act.  
While a presumption against implied repeals makes sense, 
the hard-and-fast rule forbidding implied repeals can lead to absurd 
results. For instance, in In re Aiken County, the application of this 
rule led to a mandate that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission spend 
$11.1 million toward the licensing process of Yucca Mountain as the 
United States’ future nuclear waste repository. While everyone 
agreed that it is highly unlikely that Yucca Mountain would ever be 
the country’s nuclear waste repository, and despite the fact that no 
money has been appropriated toward the project in years, the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals refused to construe the lack of 
appropriations as congressional intent to implicitly repeal the 
statutory mandate.  
Rather than applying a hard-and-fast rule forbidding 
implicit repeals, this Note, using a modified version of the Chevron 
Two-Step, argues that in certain instances, when congressional 
intent to do so is clear, implicitly repealing a prior statute based on 
a later appropriations act is appropriate. Further, this Note argues 
that when congressional intent to repeal a prior statute is not clear, 
rather than immediately compelling agency action, courts should 
conduct a three-prong balancing test and grant deference to the 
agency if the delay caused by a lack of appropriations is reasonable.  
372 Michigan State Law Review  2015:371 
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 373
I. CLIMBING YUCCA MOUNTAIN: HOW WE GOT HERE .................. 377
A.  A Growing Demand for Nuclear Energy in the United 
States ................................................................................ 378
B.  Taking Out the Trash: The Search for a Nuclear 
Waste Repository ............................................................. 379
C.  Navigating a Mountain of Litigation ............................... 383
1.  First Appeal in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals .... 384
2.  Second Challenge in the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals ...................................................................... 385
3.  Flouting the Law? The Third Challenge in the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ................................... 385
II. THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST IMPLIED REPEALS ....................... 387
A. The Presumption Against Implied Repeals in the 
Appropriations Context.................................................... 389
1. The (Potentially Flawed) Rationale for the 
Presumption Against Implied Repeals ...................... 389
2. A Prevailing Presumption: Case Law Denying 
Implicit Repeals ......................................................... 391
B. Overcoming the Odds: Beating the Presumption 
Against Implied Repeals .................................................. 395
III. AGENCY DELAYS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW ................................ 398
A. Judicial Review of Agency Inaction ................................ 398
B.  Judicial Review of Agency Delays .................................. 400
C. Judicial Review of Agency Action Under the 
Chevron Two-Step ........................................................... 401
IV. THE YUCCA TWO-STEP ............................................................ 404
A. Step One: Finding Clear Congressional Intent in 
Appropriations Acts ......................................................... 405
1. Finding Intent Through Textualism ........................... 405
2. Beyond the Text: The “Shocks-the-Conscience” 
Standard .................................................................... 406
B. Step Two: When Is Agency Action Reasonable? ............ 409
1. Legitimacy of Agency Delays: A Burden Shifting 
Approach ................................................................... 410
2. Additional Benefits of Limited Agency Action ........... 411
3. Additional Costs of Compelling Immediate 
Agency Action ............................................................ 412
CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 413
The Yucca Two-Step 373
INTRODUCTION
To the average United States citizen, the variety of ways to 
spend $11.1 million seems endless.1 For instance, those who like to 
give back could feed 1,448 families of four for a year2 or provide 
four years of college tuition to 123 students in need.3 Those who 
would rather drive fast could put down a 21% payment on the 
world’s most expensive car.4 Surely, no one would just throw this 
money away. After a recent ruling by the District of Columbia Court 
of Appeals relating to the disposal of nuclear waste in Yucca 
Mountain, Nevada,5 however, $11.1 million will be disposed of in a 
manner similar to the nuclear waste at issue: inefficiently.6
                                                
 * J.D. 2015, Michigan State University College of Law; B.A. 2012, 
Michigan State University. The author would like to thank Professor Michael 
Sant’Ambrogio for his time, mentorship, and guidance throughout the note-writing 
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major how to write. The author also thanks Kent Sparks, Katherine E. Wendt, 
Natalie O’Keefe, and the rest of the 2015 Michigan State Law Review for their 
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1. See Robert Pear, Median Income Rises, but Is Still 6% Below Level at 
Start of Recession in ‘07, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2013, at A13, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/22/us/politics/us-median-income-rises-but-is-still-
6-below-its-2007-peak.html?_r=0 (noting that in June 2013, the median annual 
household income in the United States was $52,100). 
2. Nanci Hellmich, Cost of Feeding a Family of Four: $146 to $289 a 
Week, USA TODAY (May 1, 2013, 5:27 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/news/nation/2013/05/01/grocery-costs-for-family/2104165/. 
3. Kim Clark, Tuition at Public Colleges Rises 4.8%, CNN MONEY (Oct. 
24, 2012, 10:35 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/10/24/pf/college/public-college-
tuition/ (stating that the average tuition in 2012–2013 was $22,261). 
4. Scott Reyburn, Ferrari GTO Becomes Most Expensive Car at $52 
Million, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 3, 2013, 9:31 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2013-10-02/ferrari-gto-becomes-most-expensive-car-at-52-million.html. 
5. See discussion infra Part I. The battle over where to store the country’s 
growing amount of nuclear waste has been ongoing since the 1980s. See discussion 
infra Section I.A. While it was originally settled that Yucca Mountain, Nevada, 
would be a permanent disposal site, politics have gotten in the way, and the United 
States is still not close to determining where to store its nuclear waste.  
6. See In re Aiken Cnty. (Aiken Cnty. III), 725 F.3d 255, 259-61 (D.C. Cir. 
2013) (holding that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission must comply with a 
statutory mandate and spend $11.1 million to review an application for a nuclear 
waste repository at Yucca Mountain, despite the fact that the funds are inadequate to 
complete the review process and despite the fact that there is no indication that 
additional appropriations will be set aside to complete the review process in the 
future). 
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After years of trying to find a feasible nuclear waste repository 
and an apparent solution in Yucca Mountain, it became clear in 2010 
that alternative options would have to be considered.7 A 
congressional budget that had once set aside $572 million for Yucca 
Mountain’s licensing process had declined to $0 by 2011.8 Only 
$11.1 million in funding for the project remained,9 and it was agreed 
that this amount was “wholly insufficient to complete the processing 
of the application.”10 Still, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, 
seemingly against the will of the Executive and Legislative branches, 
ordered the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to put the $11.1 
million toward the Yucca Mountain licensing process.11 The court 
made its decision in large part due to the presumption against 
implied repeals, which essentially forbids courts from assuming that 
Congress has repealed prior statutes absent a clear statement 
affirming its intention to do so.12 While the court was following a 
statutory mandate ordering the NRC to spend the funds, the court 
could have avoided the wasteful spending by taking one of two 
alternative courses of action. 
First, despite the presumption against implied repeals, the court 
could have interpreted the lack of appropriations toward Yucca 
Mountain as clear congressional intent to implicitly repeal the statute 
mandating the NRC to spend the funds.13 For several reasons, courts 
have been hesitant to repeal legislation based solely on a later 
appropriations act.14 As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
stated, however, “[w]hile the canon of statutory interpretation 
disfavoring implied repeals in appropriations bills is strong, it is still 
just a canon of interpretation. It is not an absolute rule.”15  
                                                 
 7. See discussion infra Part I.  
 8. TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41675, CLOSING YUCCA 
MOUNTAIN: LITIGATION ASSOCIATED WITH ATTEMPTS TO ABANDON THE PLANNED 
NUCLEAR WASTE REPOSITORY 3 (2012), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/ 
misc/R41675.pdf. 
 9. See Bret Kupfer, Note, Agency Discretion and Statutory Mandates in a 
Time of Inadequate Funding: An Alternative to In Re Aiken County, 46 CONN. L. 
REV. 331, 331 (2013) (noting that the $11.1 million consisted of “carryover 
appropriations” from past years).  
 10. Aiken Cnty. III, 725 F.3d at 269 (Garland, J., dissenting). 
 11. Id. at 259 (majority opinion). 
 12. Id. at 260. 
 13. See Last Best Beef, LLC v. Dudas, 506 F.3d 333, 338 (4th Cir. 2007).  
 14. See discussion infra Subsection II.A.1. 
 15. Dudas, 506 F.3d at 338. 
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Because the Supreme Court has long disfavored repealing 
statutes by implication,16 a second alternative—allowing the NRC to 
delay spending until Congress allocates additional funding—is a 
more realistic option.17 Typically, courts give a greater degree of 
deference to an agency’s decision not to act than an agency’s 
decision to take action.18 Still, there is no single standard of review 
for agency inaction; courts give more or less deference depending on 
the nature of the inaction.19 The case involving Yucca Mountain, In 
re Aiken County, involves a distinct type of agency inaction—agency 
delay—by the NRC.20 The Supreme Court has never directly 
addressed how lower courts should adjudicate agency delays,21 but 
currently, the courts most often look to the flawed22 “TRAC 
analysis” to determine whether an agency delay in rulemaking or 
adjudication is unreasonable.23 
                                                 
 16. Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936). 
 17. Comm. for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 785 
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (stating that the presumption against implied repeals “applies with 
full vigor when . . . the subsequent legislation is an appropriations measure”). 
 18. See Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial Review of 
Administrative Agency Action and Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 461, 461-62 (2008) 
(noting that with judicial review of agency action and inaction, “the level of 
deference var[ies] depending on the importance that resource allocation plays in the 
agency’s decision”); see also Peter H.A. Lehner, Note, Judicial Review of 
Administrative Inaction, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 627, 670 (1983) (noting Justice Scalia’s 
philosophy that “courts should always give deregulation or the failure to regulate 
greater deference than is given to agency decisions to regulate”). 
 19. Lehner, supra note 18, at 670 (“The intensity of regulatory oversight 
varies widely among the statutory schemes that govern administrative agencies.”). 
Given the lack of one clear standard of review, there is confusion both regarding the 
standard of review for agency inaction and “considerable uncertainty at the circuit 
level regarding the remedies that courts may consider once they have concluded that 
an agency improperly failed to act.” See Biber, supra note 18, at 462, 467. 
 20. See In re Aiken Cnty. (Aiken Cnty. II), No. 11-1271, 2012 WL 
3140360, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 3, 2012) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). In this case, 
the NRC was delaying action until it received sufficient funding to go forward. Id. 
(“The Commission resists on the ground that it does not have sufficient appropriated 
funds to complete action on the license application.”). 
 21. See Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How a Principal-Agent 
Approach Can Inform Judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-
Dragging, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1381, 1411 (2011) (“The Supreme Court has 
never addressed how a court should assess agency delay.”). 
 22. Id. at 1414 (“The TRAC analysis makes no attempt to distinguish 
between legitimate and illegitimate causes of delay, rulemaking versus adjudication, 
specific versus broad statutory mandates, or decisions about priorities versus 
substantive action.”). 
 23. Id. (“The most common approach used by the lower federal courts to 
review delays in both rulemaking proceedings and adjudications is the ‘TRAC 
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While some legal scholarship questioning the presumption 
against implied repeals when a later statute conflicts with an earlier 
enacted statute exists,24 in large part, it has accepted the courts’ view 
disfavoring the implicit repeal of a prior statute.25 Further, there is 
little legal scholarship examining judicial review of agency delays.26
This Note fills a gap in legal scholarship by providing a new 
approach to analyzing agency delays caused by a lack of 
appropriations,27 addressing both the weaknesses of the presumption 
against implied repeals28 and the TRAC analysis.29 The solution first 
requires courts to take a hard look at whether the appropriations act 
signals clear congressional intent to implicitly repeal prior 
legislation.30 In determining whether clear congressional intent exists 
to repeal the existing legislation, courts should look to both the 
amount of money that either has been appropriated or not 
appropriated to a specific project and the text of the appropriations 
act.31 If the text and funds appropriated “shock the conscience,”
signaling clear congressional intent, then the inquiry ends at step 
one, and the courts must enforce the congressional intent.32 If 
congressional intent is not made clear through the appropriations act 
and funds appropriated, however, the courts must proceed to step 
two of the test and engage in a modified approach to the flawed 
TRAC analysis to determine whether the agency’s delay is 
                                                                                                      
analysis’ . . . .”). The “TRAC Analysis” derives from Telecommunications Research 
& Action Center v. FCC (TRAC v. FCC), 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The TRAC 
test employs a six-factor balancing test to determine whether or not the agency delay 
is unreasonable. Id. at 80. 
24. See generally Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J.
1343 (1988); Karen Petroski, Comment, Retheorizing the Presumption Against 
Implied Repeals, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 487, 488-91 (2004). 
25. But see Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Canonical 
Construction and Statutory Revisionism: The Strange Case of the Appropriations 
Canon, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 669, 671 (2005) (arguing that the “canon 
disfavoring legislative changes through the appropriations process [is] unjustified as 
a matter of positive political theory”).
26. See Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 21, at 1402 (“Legal scholars have 
devoted little attention to judicial review of agency delays or to the role that courts 
might play in curing them.”).
27. See discussion infra Part IV. 
28. See discussion infra Subsection II.A.1. 
29. See discussion supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
30. See discussion infra Section IV.A. 
31. See discussion infra Section IV.A. 
32. See discussion infra Section IV.A.
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reasonable.33 By applying this two-prong test, courts will avoid 
nonsensical results and save both time and money. 
Part I examines the history and legislation leading to the 
designation of Yucca Mountain as a site for nuclear waste disposal as 
well as the Department of Energy’s attempts to overturn this 
decision.34 It looks at the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals’ three 
decisions, eventually leading to the ruling that the NRC must 
continue to research Yucca Mountain as a potential site for nuclear 
waste disposal, even though Congress has not appropriated 
additional funds toward the project in years.35 Part II examines past 
decisions of the courts that have led to the presumption against 
implied repeals.36 Specifically, this Part examines how in certain 
cases, congressional appropriations can and should be used as a clear 
signal of Congress’s intent to implicitly repeal a prior statute.37 Part 
III discusses the current method that courts use to review agency 
delays and addresses the concerns present with this method.38 Part IV 
outlines a new two-prong test that applies in situations where an 
agency delay results from a lack of appropriations.39 This test both 
(1) analyzes situations where appropriations alone can signal clear 
congressional intent to repeal existing legislation; and (2) determines 
when agency delays due to a lack of appropriations are reasonable.40  
I. CLIMBING YUCCA MOUNTAIN: HOW WE GOT HERE 
As the demand for nuclear power grew throughout the 1900s, 
so did the amount of nuclear waste, creating a question that still 
exists today: Where should it go? The United States has struggled for 
years to find a permanent disposal site for its growing amount of 
nuclear waste.41 While it once appeared all but certain that Yucca 
Mountain would be the answer to this problem, due to a variety of 
factors, it is now highly unlikely that nuclear waste will ever be 
stored at Yucca Mountain.42 After years of litigation in the D.C. 
                                                 
 33. See discussion infra Section IV.A. 
 34. See discussion infra Part I. 
 35. See discussion infra Part I. 
 36. See discussion infra Part II. 
 37. See discussion infra Part II. 
 38. See discussion infra Part III. 
 39. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 40. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 41. See discussion infra Section I.B. 
 42. See discussion infra Section I.B. 
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Circuit Court of Appeals and a dwindling budget, the country is still 
searching for its nuclear waste repository.43 By examining the history 
of the country’s search for a nuclear waste repository, and the D.C. 
Circuit’s holding that the NRC must spend $11.1 million researching 
Yucca Mountain as a waste repository despite the fact that all 
indications point to the spending as being useless, it becomes clear 
that judicial review of agency delays caused by a lack of 
appropriations must be reexamined.  
A. A Growing Demand for Nuclear Energy in the United States  
The nuclear energy industry, unlike any other energy industry, 
is a public enterprise and one that grew to unprecedented heights 
throughout the late 1900s.44 The demand for nuclear energy in the 
United States began in 1946, when Congress granted the Atomic 
Energy Commission (AEC) the responsibility to regulate the 
industry.45 Eight years later, Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954.46 The Atomic Energy Act encouraged nuclear energy 
usage,47 and consequently, the nuclear energy industry began to grow 
at a rapid pace. By 2007, nuclear power plants in the United States 
had generated more nuclear power than Central America, South 
America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East combined.48 Serious 
                                                 
 43. See discussion infra Sections I.B-C. 
 44. Megan Easley, Note, Standing in Nuclear Waste: Challenging the 
Disposal of Yucca Mountain, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 659, 662, 664 (2012) (“From its 
inception, nuclear power has been uniquely positioned as the ‘only energy source 
that began as, and remains, a primarily public enterprise.’” (quoting MARC ALLEN 
EISNER, JEFF WORSHAM & EVAN J. RINGQUIST, CONTEMPORARY REGULATORY 
POLICY 270 (2d ed. 2006))). 
 45. See History, U.S. NRC, http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/history.html (last 
updated Sept. 30, 2014) (explaining that after Congress passed the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1946, nuclear regulation was the responsibility of the Atomic Energy 
Commission). 
 46. Act of Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 919, 921 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 47. 42 U.S.C. § 2011(a) (2012) (“It is . . . the policy of the United States 
that—(a) the development, use, and control of atomic energy shall be directed so as 
to make the maximum contribution to the general welfare, subject . . . to the 
paramount objective of making the maximum contribution to the common defense 
and security . . . .”). 
 48. Easley, supra note 44, at 662 (“The sixty-five nuclear power plants . . . 
in thirty-one states have historically generated an average of one-fifth of the United 
States’ electricity supply. In 2007, these nuclear power plants generated over eight 
hundred billion kilowatt-hours of electric power, more than nuclear power in Central 
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discussions regarding where to put the growing amount of nuclear 
waste in the United States did not begin, however, until the country 
had no choice but to address the problem in 1979.49  
B. Taking Out the Trash: The Search for a Nuclear Waste Repository 
Despite the growing popularity of nuclear energy during the 
latter half of the 1900s, United States industry experts initially put 
little effort into finding a permanent nuclear waste repository.50 In 
1965, the AEC began storing spent nuclear fuel in an abandoned salt 
mine in Lyons, Kansas,51 and in June 1970, the AEC decided to build 
a federal high-level waste repository in the Lyons mine.52 As a 
precursor to the United States’ unsuccessful attempts to find an 
adequate solution for nuclear waste disposal, however, a mixture of 
adverse public reaction and political pressure caused the project’s 
cancellation in 1972.53 
The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 disbanded the AEC 
and created the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)54 in an effort 
to “promote more efficient management” of nuclear energy and 
                                                                                                       
America, South America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East combined.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 49. See discussion infra Section I.B. 
 50. See Easley, supra note 44, at 664 n.29 (“‘For many years, the United 
States nuclear establishment felt no urgency about the waste disposal problem 
because it appeared to be easily solvable and not technically interesting.’” (quoting 
DAVID BODANSKY, NUCLEAR ENERGY: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES, AND PROSPECTS 254 
(2d ed. 2004))). Across the world, however, a greater concern may have existed. See 
Tom Kenny, Note, Where to Put It All? Opening the Judicial Road for a Long-Term 
Solution to the Nation’s Nuclear Waste Problem, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1319, 
1321 (2011) (noting that in 1959, Pyotr Kapitsa, a Russian Nobel Prize winner, 
proposed sending nuclear waste to outer space; other disposal options that have been 
considered include “ocean dumping, subseabed disposal, and reprocessing the spent 
nuclear fuel to recover uranium and plutonium” (footnote omitted)). 
 51. Letter from J. Dexter Peach, Director, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, to 
Nancy L. Kassebaum, U.S. Senator (Mar. 23, 1982), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/140/136974.pdf. 
 52. Id. at 2. “High-level waste . . . is characterized by high-levels of 
penetrating radiation and must be isolated from the environment for many thousands 
of years,” whereas “[l]ow-level nuclear waste . . . ranges from materials suspected of 
being slightly contaminated with radiation to highly contaminated materials which 
remain radioactive for long periods of time.” Id. at 1 nn.1-2. 
 53. Id. at 2 (“Before . . . issues could be resolved . . . adverse public and 
political reaction caused the project to be cancelled in 1972.”). 
 54. See Adam J. White, Yucca Mountain: A Post-Mortem, 37 NEW 
ATLANTIS 3, 6 (2012) (explaining that when President Ford signed the Energy 
Reorganization Act and created the NRC, it effectively terminated the AEC).  
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research.55 Despite the creation of the NRC, the country made little 
progress in its search for a permanent nuclear waste repository until 
1979.56 On March 28, 1979, nuclear power came to the forefront of 
national attention as a result of the Three Mile Island crisis in 
Pennsylvania,57 when an accident melted half of a nuclear reactor’s 
core and prompted fear of radioactive contamination throughout the 
country.58 As a result, in 1981, President Reagan instructed the 
Secretary of Energy, James Edwards, to develop a solution for the 
storage and disposal of nuclear waste.59 Edwards’s proposed solution 
was the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1983 (NWPA).60 
The NWPA originally called for the Department of Energy’s 
(DOE) Secretary to identify five potential locations for the country’s 
first nuclear waste repository.61 After nominating the initial sites, the 
Secretary had until January 1, 1985, to recommend three final sites to 
the President.62 No later than sixty days after receiving the 
Secretary’s submissions, the President was to approve or disapprove 
of each site.63 The DOE studied sites in Mississippi, Nevada, Texas, 
Utah, and Washington, and in 1986, the Secretary of Energy 
recommended three potential sites: Yucca Mountain, Nevada; Deaf 
Smith County, Texas; and Hanford Engineer Works, Washington.64 
                                                 
 55. Act of Oct. 11, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233, 1233 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 56. See BODANSKY, supra note 50, at 254. 
 57. See Backgrounder on the Three Mile Island Accident, U.S. NRC, 
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html (last 
updated Dec. 12, 2014). On March 28, 1979, the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) 
reactor partially melted down, resulting in “the most serious accident in U.S. 
commercial nuclear power plant operating history.” Id. Both the NRC and the public 
were concerned that the reactor’s core may burn or explode. Id. The NRC Chairman 
and the Governor of Pennsylvania agreed that it would be in the public’s best 
interest to evacuate the area near the plant, and pregnant women and preschool-aged 
children within five miles were advised to leave the area. Id. 
 58. See History, supra note 45. 
 59. See White, supra note 54, at 6. 
 60. See Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 
2201 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 10101 (1982)). Congress passed the NWPA after 
acknowledging that “[f]ederal efforts during the past 30 years to devise a permanent 
solution to the problems of civilian radioactive waste . . . have not been adequate.” 
42 U.S.C. § 10131(a)(3). 
 61. Id. § 10132(b)(1)(A) (“[T]he Secretary shall nominate at least 5 sites 
that he determines suitable for site characterization for selection of the first 
repository site.”). 
 62. Id. § 10132(b)(1)(B). 
 63. Id. § 10132(c)(1). 
 64. See White, supra note 54, at 6-7. 
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Despite the Secretary’s three recommendations, Congress 
“short-circuited the original process,”65 making Yucca Mountain the 
only possible site.66 While Harry Reid, Nevada’s junior senator at the 
time, believed the decision resulted solely from politics,67 it appeared 
that the nation had finally settled on a nuclear waste repository.68 
Over the next fifteen years, the DOE performed site-characterization 
activities, resting on the assumption that Yucca Mountain would be 
the nation’s nuclear waste repository.69 In 2002, the DOE gave a final 
recommendation in favor of Yucca Mountain as the country’s 
permanent nuclear waste repository,70 which President George W. 
Bush immediately approved.71  
Predictably, the State of Nevada objected to dumping the 
country’s nuclear waste on its land, but Congress nonetheless passed 
a joint resolution approving the selection of Yucca Mountain.72 After 
Congress completed the site-selection process, the DOE was given 
ninety days to submit a licensing application for a repository at 
Yucca Mountain to the NRC.73 While it took six years rather than 
ninety days,74 the DOE finally submitted a licensing application 
                                                 
 65. In re Aiken Cnty. (Aiken Cnty. I), 645 F.3d 428, 431 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 66. See Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 
2201 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 10172 (1988)) (directing the Secretary to “provide for 
an orderly phase-out of site specific activities at all candidate sites other than the 
Yucca Mountain site”). 
 67. See Susan Rasky, Nevada May End Up Holding the Nuclear Bag, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 20, 1987, at E4. Reid described the decision as “base, raw, power 
politics.” Id. 
 68. Id. (noting that Senator J. Bennett Johnston, a Louisiana Democrat, 
stated, “‘I think it’s fair to say we’ve solved the nuclear waste problem with this 
legislation’”). 
 69. See 42 U.S.C. § 10133(b)(1)(A)(i)-(v) (1982). Site-characterization 
activities under this statute included a description of the extent of the planned 
excavations, plans for any onsite testing with radioactive or nonradioactive material, 
criteria to be used to determine the suitability of each candidate site, plans for the 
decontamination of each candidate site, and any other information required by the 
Commission. Id. 
 70. Aiken Cnty. I, 645 F.3d at 431. 
 71. See White, supra note 54, at 9. 
 72. Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 373 F.3d 1251, 1309 
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (“The Resolution affirmatively and finally approved the Yucca site 
for a repository, thus bringing the site-selection process to a conclusion.”). 
 73. Aiken Cnty. I, 645 F.3d at 432 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 10134(b)). 
 74. Id. As part of the licensing application process, the DOE was required 
to show that Yucca Mountain could meet the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
standards for protecting public health, but the DOE “experienced persistent 
problems with its quality assurance program for the Yucca Mountain project,” 
substantially slowing down the licensing process. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
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seeking approval to construct a geologic repository at Yucca 
Mountain on June 3, 2008.75 
While the United States had supposedly “solved the nuclear 
waste problem” with prior legislation,76 then-Senator Barack 
Obama’s presidential campaign coincided with the timing of the 
DOE’s licensing application submission.77 With the State of Nevada 
a key battleground in the 2008 election, and Senate Majority Leader 
Harry Reid of Nevada vehemently opposing Yucca Mountain as the 
country’s nuclear waste disposal site, then-Senator Obama vowed 
that he would “end the notion of Yucca Mountain.”78 In 2008, with 
President Obama officially elected, Harry Reid was doing everything 
in his power to make sure that Yucca Mountain would never become 
the nation’s nuclear waste dumping ground.79 In May 2009, Gregory 
Jaczko, a former staffer of Reid—the man who had previously 
described the 1987 NWPA Amendment as the “‘[S]crew Nevada’ 
[B]ill”80—was now in charge of the NRC.81 As a result of the 
political reorganization, the DOE filed a motion in 2010 to withdraw 
its licensing application with prejudice,82 asserting that the site was 
                                                                                                       
OFFICE, GAO-07-1010, DOE HAS IMPROVED ITS QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM, 
BUT WHETHER ITS APPLICATION FOR A NRC LICENSE WILL BE HIGH QUALITY IS 
UNCLEAR 2 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/270/265042.pdf. 
 75. Department of Energy; Notice of Acceptance for Docketing of a 
License Application for Authority to Construct a Geologic Repository at a Geologic 
Repository Operations Area at Yucca Mountain, NV, 73 Fed. Reg. 53284, 53284 
(Sept. 15, 2008). 
 76. Rasky, supra note 67, at E4 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 77. For an advertisement of then-Senator Barack Obama attacking then-
Senator John McCain for supporting Yucca Mountain as a nuclear waste repository, 
see Sarah Wheaton, Obama Ad Attacks McCain on Yucca Mountain, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 9, 2008, 2:27 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/08/09/obama-ad-
attacks-mccain-on-yucca-mountain/?_r=0. 
 78. Easley, supra note 44, at 673 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 
Editorial, Where Does It All Go?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2008, at A26). 
 79. See White, supra note 54, at 4 (stating that the Obama administration 
“unilaterally nullif[ied] the decades-old statutory framework for Yucca 
[Mountain]”). 
 80. Amber Phillips, What Republicans’ Big Win Means for Harry Reid’s 
Fight Against Yucca Mountain, LAS VEGAS SUN (Nov. 7, 2014, 2:00 AM), 
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2014/nov/07/what-republicans-big-win-means-
nevadas-yucca-mount/. 
 81. See White, supra note 54, at 10-11. 
 82. To withdraw with prejudice “is a final adjudication of the issues 
presented by the pleadings and normally bars further suit between the parties on the 
same cause of action.” Slotkin v. Brookdale Hosp. Ctr., 377 F. Supp. 275, 277 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974). This would have the effect of permanently banning Yucca 
Mountain from consideration as the nation’s nuclear waste disposal site. 
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no longer a viable option for the long-term disposal of nuclear 
waste.83  
By 2010, in addition to the political influences, congressional 
budget proposals also suggested that options other than Yucca 
Mountain should be considered as the country’s nuclear waste 
repository.84 The 2005 fiscal year budget proposal set aside $572 
million to finance the Yucca Mountain licensing process.85 This 
number dropped to $288 million in 2009, and in 2010 dropped 
further to $197 million.86 In 2011, 2012, and 2013, budget proposals 
cut out all funding toward Yucca Mountain.87 
C. Navigating a Mountain of Litigation 
Just as political pressure and a lack of funding have drawn out 
the DOE’s search for a permanent nuclear waste repository,88 so too 
has a stream of litigation that began in 2010.89 State and local 
government units that were forced to temporarily store nuclear 
waste, as well as private citizens living near the temporary waste 
sites, challenged the DOE’s motion to withdraw its licensing 
application for Yucca Mountain.90 The Atomic Safety and Licensing 
Board Panel (ASLBP) originally denied the DOE’s motion to 
withdraw with prejudice in 2010 because the NWPA forbids the 
DOE from doing so.91 The matter was not resolved completely until 
                                                 
 83. Aiken Cnty. I, 645 F.3d 428, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[The DOE] ‘does 
not intend ever to refile an application to construct a permanent geologic 
repository . . . at Yucca Mountain.’” (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Energy (High-Level 
Waste Repository), 71 N.R.C. 609, 629 (2010))). 
 84. GARVEY, supra note 8, at 6 & n.45. 
 85. Id. at 3. 
 86. Id. For an illustration of how quickly funding for Yucca Mountain was 
being cut in 2010, see Stephen Power, Chu, Orszag at Odds over Yucca Funding, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 14, 2010, 3:34 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424052748703414504575001852488180226. 
 87. GARVEY, supra note 8 (“[T]he [Obama] Administration’s FY2011, 
FY2012, and FY2013 budget proposals eliminated all funding for the Yucca 
Mountain project.”). 
 88. See discussion supra Section I.B. 
 89. Aiken Cnty. I, 645 F.3d 428 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 90. Id. at 431. These state and local government units were Aiken County, 
South Carolina, the State of South Carolina, and the State of Washington. Id. 
 91. U.S. Dep’t of Energy (High-Level Waste Repository), 74 N.R.C. 368, 
368-69 (2011); U.S. Dep’t of Energy (High-Level Waste Repository), 71 N.R.C. 
609, 617 (2010) (finding that the NWPA “mandates progress toward a merits 
decision by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the construction permit”). The 
ASLBP is the “trial-level adjudicatory body of the NRC” that conducts public 
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August 13, 2013, when the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals made its 
ruling in In re Aiken County.92 
1. First Appeal in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
After the ASLBP denied the DOE’s motion to withdraw, the 
Secretary of the NRC reviewed briefs arguing what action the NRC 
should take with respect to the decision.93 The same petitioners from 
the ASLBP decision challenged the DOE’s “apparent decision to 
abandon development of the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste 
repository.”94 Petitioners feared that if Yucca Mountain was never 
used as a nuclear waste repository, then the temporarily stored waste 
would remain in their jurisdictions for years to come.95 The court 
acknowledged that Petitioners’ fears were reasonable, but stated that 
Petitioners’ challenges to the administrative process were premature 
until Petitioners could demonstrate that one of the respondents had 
violated a clear duty to act or otherwise violated the law.96 
                                                                                                       
hearings as well as uncontested hearings. ASLBP Responsibilities, U.S. NRC, 
http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/adjudicatory/aslbp-respons.html (last 
updated Jan. 10, 2014). Each Licensing Board is typically made up of three 
administrative judges, “usually consisting of one attorney skilled in the conduct of 
administrative hearings and two experts in scientific or technical areas relevant to 
the subject matter [in] dispute.” Id. 
 92. See Aiken Cnty. III, 725 F.3d 255, 257 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 93. Aiken Cnty. I, 645 F.3d at 432 (“[T]he Secretary of the Commission 
invited all of the participants before the Licensing Board to file briefs as to whether 
the Commission should review, reverse, or uphold the Licensing Board’s decision to 
deny the DOE’s motion to withdraw.”). 
 94. Id. at 430. As evidence that the DOE was attempting to abandon Yucca 
Mountain, Petitioners pointed to the fact that the DOE had drafted plans to shut 
down Yucca Mountain and had announced that it was abandoning Yucca Mountain 
when it created a Blue Ribbon Commission to find another way to dispose of 
nuclear waste. Id. at 430, 433. The petitioners argued that the DOE did not have the 
legal authority to withdraw its application, and therefore, the DOE’s actions violated 
the NWPA. Id. at 433. Petitioners further argued that the DOE violated the National 
Environmental Policy Act because it took actions to abandon Yucca Mountain 
permanently and without preparing an environmental impact statement. Id.  
 95. Id. at 434. 
 96. Id. at 434, 437. For an analysis of which Petitioners should have had 
standing to challenge the NWPA and seek redress, see Easley, supra note 44, at 686. 
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2. Second Challenge in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
In 2012, the same Petitioners filed suit again.97 The NRC was 
required to issue a final decision approving or disapproving the 
DOE’s licensing application no later than three years after its 
licensing submission.98 The DOE filed the original application in 
June 2008, and after over three years of inaction, in 2012, Petitioners 
asked the D.C. Circuit to order the NRC to comply with the statutory 
mandate.99 The NRC refused to act on the licensing application 
because it did not have sufficient funds to complete the application 
process.100 The court did not grant mandamus to Petitioners because 
the issue would become moot if Congress either appropriated 
additional funds to the NRC in 2013 or enacted a new statute 
forbidding the NRC from using the remaining appropriations toward 
the application process.101 The court, however, acknowledged that if 
Congress did not provide additional instructions to the NRC, then it 
would act on the petition for mandamus in the future.102  
3.  Flouting the Law? The Third Challenge in the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals 
As it turned out, Congress did not provide additional 
instructions to the NRC, and on August 13, 2013, the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals granted the Petitioners mandamus, finding that the 
NRC’s refusal to complete the licensing application process violated 
the law.103 The court reasoned that while it was not disputed that the 
$11.1 million that the NRC had to conduct the licensing process was 
                                                 
 97. Aiken Cnty. II, No. 11-1271, 2012 WL 3140360 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 3, 
2012). 
 98. 42 U.S.C. § 10134(d) (1982).  
 99. Aiken Cnty. II, 2012 WL 3140360, at *1-2 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) 
(“Petitioners seek mandamus. They ask us to order the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission to comply with the statutory mandate requiring the Commission to act 
on the Department of Energy’s long-pending license application to store nuclear 
waste at Yucca Mountain.”). 
 100. Id. at *1. 
 101. Id. (“Congress’s upcoming appropriations decisions could well affect 
whether those expenditures are necessary.”). 
 102. Id. (“Of course, it is possible that Congress will take neither of those 
steps . . . . In that circumstance, I believe mandamus likely would have to be 
granted. An . . . agency generally has no authority to disregard a statute that 
mandates or prohibits specific agency actions . . . .”). 
 103. Aiken Cnty. III, 725 F.3d 255, 257 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
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insufficient,104 Congress often appropriates money gradually, and 
agencies cannot ignore statutory mandates because there is not 
sufficient funding to complete the project.105 Importantly, the court 
ruled that although congressional appropriations had been 
nonexistent in the last three years, it could not construe the lack of 
appropriations as congressional intent to implicitly repeal the 
statutory mandate.106 The court reasoned that just because this 
particular Congress refused to make additional appropriations to 
continue the licensing process does not mean that a future Congress 
will come to the same decision.107 The court accused the NRC of 
“flouting the law”108 and mandated the NRC to continue with the 
licensing process until it either exhausted the remaining funds or 
Congress explicitly repealed the law.109  
In his dissent, Chief Judge Garland argued that granting 
Petitioners’ writ of mandamus would cause the NRC “to do ‘a 
useless thing.’”110 The NRC had concluded that it could not make any 
meaningful progress toward the licensing application with $11.1 
million,111 and Chief Judge Garland stated that with only limited 
                                                 
 104. Id. at 269 (Garland, J., dissenting) (stating that “[n]o one disputes that 
$11 million is wholly insufficient to complete the processing of the application”). 
 105. Id. at 259 (majority opinion). A delay in agency action may be caused 
by an agency’s attempt to ensure that its decision is consistent with the wishes of the 
enacting Congress; however, delays in agency action also occur for other reasons, 
such as “Congress’s failure to provide the agency with the resources necessary to 
achieve its mandated goals.” Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 21, at 1393. There can be 
no doubt that in this case, the agency delay was caused by congressional failure to 
provide the agency with the necessary resources. See Aiken Cnty. III, 725 F.3d at 
260. 
 106. Aiken Cnty. III, 725 F.3d at 260 (“[C]ourts generally should not infer 
that Congress has implicitly repealed or suspended statutory mandates based simply 
on the amount of money Congress has appropriated.” (citing Tenn. Valley Auth. v. 
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978))). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 259. 
 109. Id. at 267 (stating that “unless and until Congress authoritatively says 
otherwise or there are no appropriated funds remaining, the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission must promptly continue with the legally mandated licensing process”). 
 110. Id. at 269 (Garland, J., dissenting) (quoting United States ex rel. Sierra 
Land & Water Co. v. Ickes, 84 F.2d 228, 232 (D.C. Cir. 1936)). 
 111. See id. (“The NRC . . . has suspended the application proceeding until 
there are sufficient funds to make meaningful progress.”). The Supreme Court has 
previously acknowledged that decisions such as this are precisely within an agency’s 
expertise and one of the reasons agencies exist in the first place.  
[A]n agency’s allocation of funds from a lump-sum appropriation requires 
“a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly 
within its expertise”: whether its “resources are best spent” on one 
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funds remaining, granting the writ of mandamus would force the 
NRC to spend those funds unpacking its boxes and then repacking 
them again.112 Nevertheless, largely because of the presumption 
against implied repeals, the court had made its decision to require the 
NRC to carry out a “useless” process.113  
II. THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST IMPLIED REPEALS 
To understand why the In re Aiken County court did not 
interpret Congress’s lack of appropriations as a clear signal that 
Congress no longer intended to use Yucca Mountain as the country’s 
nuclear waste repository, it is best to begin with the doctrine of 
implied repeals.114 The doctrine of implied repeals allows Congress, 
through the enactment of new legislation, to repeal existing statutes 
without explicitly stating its intention to do so.115 If the two statutes 
conflict, the later act, “even without a specific repealing clause, 
operates to the extent of the repugnancy to repeal the first.”116 Most 
courts, however, follow a statutory canon providing a presumption 
against the implicit repeal of prior statutes.117 Although the United 
States Supreme Court has acknowledged that legislation may be 
repealed by implication if the legislature’s intent to do so is clear,118 
as a practical matter, the presumption against implied repeals has 
today transformed into a hard-and-fast rule forbidding implied 
repeals.119 
                                                                                                       
program or another; whether it is “likely to succeed” in fulfilling its 
statutory mandate; whether a particular program “best fits the agency’s 
overall policies”; and, “indeed, whether the agency has enough resources” 
to fund a program “at all.”  
Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 193 (1993) (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 
821, 831 (1985)). 
 112. Aiken Cnty. III, 725 F.3d at 270 (Garland, J., dissenting). 
 113. Id. at 269. 
 114. The D.C. Circuit’s holding relied heavily on the presumption against 
implied repeals, stating that “courts generally should not infer that Congress has 
implicitly repealed or suspended statutory mandates based simply on the amount of 
money Congress has appropriated.” Id. at 260 (majority opinion).  
 115. 1A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, STATUTES AND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 23:9 (7th ed. 2009). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. § 23:10. 
 118. See Posadas v. Nat’l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936) (noting that 
the “intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear and manifest”). 
 119. See Petroski, supra note 24, at 489 (stating that especially as of late, 
“the absence of any principled understanding of the purposes served by the 
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The presumption against implied repeals arises most often 
when a new statute conflicts with an existing statute.120 If there are 
two reasonable interpretations of the statute, then the judge should 
choose the interpretation that does not conflict with the existing 
statute.121 If the two statutes cannot be reconciled, however, then only 
the portion of the earlier statute that cannot be reconciled should be 
repealed.122 Those in favor of the presumption against implied repeals 
argue that because the legislature is aware of all existing statutes, it 
would explicitly state its intention to repeal an existing statute if it 
wanted to do so.123 Without an affirmative statement of the 
legislature’s intent to repeal existing legislation, courts have held that 
the only two situations where repeal by implication may be found are 
(1) when provisions of the two acts directly and irreconcilably 
conflict; and (2) when the subsequent statute is “clearly intended as a 
substitute” of the prior statute.124  
                                                                                                       
presumption against implied repeals seems to have led a majority of current 
Supreme Court justices to transform the presumption into a rule forbidding implied 
repeals”). 
 120. See LINDA D. JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 146 
(Russell Weaver ed., 2008). One of the most cited cases discussing implied repeals, 
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), arose after a new statute, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, conflicted with but did not explicitly repeal 
an existing statute, the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. Id. at 537. The Indian 
Reorganization Act stated that when making appointments to various positions, 
“‘qualified Indians shall . . . have the preference to appointment to vacancies.’” Id. 
at 538 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 472 (1934)). The later-enacted Equal Opportunity Act 
of 1972 stated that appointments to positions “‘shall be made free from any 
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.’” Id. at 540 & 
n.6 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (Supp II 1973)). The Supreme Court refused 
to find that the new statute implicitly repealed the existing statute because the 
“‘cardinal rule’” is that implicit repeals are disfavored. Id. at 549 (citing Posadas, 
296 U.S. at 503; Universal Interpretive Shuttle Corp. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit 
Comm’n, 393 U.S. 186, 193 (1968)). 
 121. JELLUM, supra note 120, at 146. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. (stating that the presumption against implied repeals rests “on the 
potentially flawed presumption that the legislature was aware of the conflicting, 
existing law and specifically opted not to repeal it”). 
 124. Posadas, 296 U.S. at 503. 
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A. The Presumption Against Implied Repeals in the Appropriations 
Context 
The presumption against implied repeals applies with “full 
vigor” when the subsequent statute is an appropriations measure.125 
In fact, “the policy applies with even greater force when the claimed 
repeal rests solely on the Appropriations Act”126 because there is an 
assumption that the legislature does not thoroughly deliberate over 
appropriations measures.127 Just like any canon of statutory 
interpretation, however, the presumption against implied repeals can 
be overcome if there is specific evidence showing that Congress 
intended to implicitly repeal the prior statute through a subsequent 
appropriations bill.128  
1.  The (Potentially Flawed) Rationale for the Presumption 
Against Implied Repeals 
There are several reasons why the Court has stated that the 
presumption against implied repeals applies “with even greater 
force” when it rests solely on an appropriations act.129 The greatest 
concern is that some members of Congress will be oblivious to the 
nuances of the new appropriations act and its effect on existing 
laws.130 There is also a concern that appropriations laws are “‘short-
sighted and have little effect on the law beyond the years for which 
they apportion public monies.’”131 The appropriations process, as 
compared with the authorization process,132 has been described as 
                                                 
 125. Comm. for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 785 
(D.C. Cir. 1971). 
 126. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978) (italics omitted). 
 127. McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 25, at 687-88. 
 128. See JELLUM, supra note 120, at 147. 
 129. See Hill, 437 U.S. at 190 (italics omitted). 
 130. See McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 25, at 686, 689 (explaining 
that when existing legislation is explicitly repealed, the courts have the comfort of 
knowing that Congress is fully aware of the repeal and its implications on existing 
law, as all members of Congress are required to vote to repeal legislation; only the 
Appropriations Committee, however, determines how much funding to set aside for 
certain projects). 
 131. Id. at 688 (quoting William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-
Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1215 (2001)). 
 132. “The most important forms of annual legislation are authorization and 
appropriation acts.” KENNETH J. ALLEN, FEDERAL GRANT PRACTICE: A GUIDE FOR 
THE GOVERNMENT AND GRANTEES § 8.5 (2014). An authorization of appropriations is 
a directive to Congress that allows for the funding of the subject at issue. Id. On the 
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“hurried, opaque, and, on the whole, nondeliberative.”133 The courts 
have shown a clear preference for deliberative decision-making in 
Congress.134 Therefore, when two statutes conflict, they will likely 
favor the statute passed through an authorization act as opposed to an 
appropriations act.135 
While these concerns are not without merit, Mathew D. 
McCubbins and Daniel B. Rodriguez136 make compelling arguments 
that they are not quite as pronounced as some have argued.137 
Addressing the first major concern—that not all members of 
Congress are aware of the intricacies of appropriations acts—
McCubbins and Rodriguez point out the high level of involvement 
that legislators have with the appropriations process.138 Supporting 
this notion is the fact that currently, the House Appropriations 
Committee consists of fifty-one members from thirty states,139 and 
the Senate Appropriations Committee consists of thirty members.140 
Further, the members of the House Appropriations Committee are 
“ideologically similar to the party they represent, and in the 
aggregate are quite close to the entire House membership.”141 The 
makeup of the Committees, combined with the high frequency that 
appropriations bills are amended,142 suggests that there is more 
congressional exposure to appropriations bills than supporters of the 
presumption against implied repeals suggest. McCubbins and 
Rodriguez also address the concern that the appropriations process is 
                                                                                                       
other hand, an appropriations act provides the “‘budget authority’” for the funding at 
issue. Id.  
 133. See McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 25, at 688. 
 134. Id. at 689-90. 
 135. Id. at 690. 
 136. At the time of publishing their article, Mathew D. McCubbins was a 
“Distinguished Professor and Chancellor’s Associates Chair VIII” of the University 
of California, San Diego’s Department of Political Science, and Daniel B. Rodriguez 
was “Dean and Professor of Law” at the University of San Diego School of Law. Id. 
at 669 n.*. 
 137. See generally id. at 707-08. 
 138. Id. at 695 (stating that legislators have a “direct and significant” impact 
on the appropriations process). 
 139. See Full Committee Members, U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES, 
http://appropriations.house.gov/about/members/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2015) 
(providing a complete list of members of the House Appropriations Committee). 
 140. Committee Members, U.S. SENATE, 
http://www.appropriations.senate.gov/about-committee/committee-members (last 
visited Feb. 9, 2015). 
 141. McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 25, at 696. 
 142. Id. (describing appropriations bills as “among the most frequently 
amended of all legislation”). 
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“hurried, opaque, and . . . nondeliberative,”143 arguing that the 
process is in fact thorough and transparent given the time spent 
creating the appropriations budget and the multitude of information 
that is available to the public at large throughout the process.144  
To understand how the presumption against implied repeals 
came to apply to appropriations measures, and the rationale given by 
the courts, it is important to focus on prior case law where the 
presumption against implied repeals has been upheld.145 In particular, 
the cases of Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,146 commonly known 
as the “Snail Darter case,”147 and Calloway v. District of Columbia148 
illustrate the difficulty of overcoming the presumption against 
implied repeals in the appropriations context.149 As other cases prove, 
however, the presumption against implied repeals is not impossible 
to overcome.150 
2.  A Prevailing Presumption: Case Law Denying Implicit 
Repeals 
In 1967, the Tennessee Valley Authority began constructing 
the Tellico Dam along the Little Tennessee River.151 The dam was 
designed to hold water covering 16,500 acres of farmland and to 
provide significant value to the area.152 Congress, recognizing this, 
had appropriated funds to the project every year since 1967.153 
                                                 
 143. Id. at 688, 701-07. 
 144. Id. at 702. The creation of the appropriations budget “begins more than 
a year and a half before appropriations legislation is crafted with reports by the 
General Accounting Office and estimates from executive agencies.” Id. “Then, 12 
months before the legislation hits the floor, the Office of Management and Budget 
produces its budget review.” Id. Further, when creating the federal appropriations 
budget, committee reports and any other documentation involved in the process are 
made available to any interested person, which is “unlike regular legislation where 
there is no public release requirement for staff and committee reports until 48 hours 
before the vote.” Id.  
 145. See discussion infra Subsection II.A.2. 
 146. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
 147. Harry S. Mattice, Jr., Winning a Battle, Losing a War: The “Snail 
Darter Case” and the Changing Relationship Between Law and Media, 80 TENN. L. 
REV. 549, 549 (2013). 
 148. 216 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  
 149. See discussion infra Subsection II.A.2. 
 150. See discussion infra Section II.B. 
 151. Hill, 437 U.S. at 156-57. The Tennessee Valley Authority is a “wholly 
owned public corporation of the United States.” Id. 
 152. Id. at 157. 
 153. Id. at 157-58. 
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Despite the continuing appropriations toward the project and the 
apparent value it would add to the area, the Supreme Court ordered 
the Tennessee Valley Authority to stop the project during the middle 
of its construction because of the Endangered Species Act.154 
In 1973, Congress passed the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 
authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to declare a species of life 
endangered.155 Once a species was declared endangered, federal 
departments and agencies were required to ensure that their actions 
did not jeopardize the continued existence of the endangered 
species.156 In 1975, the snail darter157 was listed as an endangered 
species, and the Secretary of the Interior determined that the snail 
darter’s “critical habitat” was the area of the Tellico Dam that had 
been under construction since 1967.158 Consequently, the ESA 
ordered the Tennessee Valley Authority to immediately halt 
construction on the Tellico Dam in order to avoid jeopardizing the 
snail darter’s critical habitat.159  
Even after the Tellico Dam was named the snail darter’s critical 
habitat, however, Tennessee Valley Authority continued to receive 
congressional appropriations to be allocated toward the completion 
of the dam.160 In February 1976, respondents filed suit arguing that, 
by continuing to construct the dam, Tennessee Valley Authority was 
in direct violation of the ESA.161 The district court dismissed the 
complaint because the project was already 80% complete and $53 
million that had already been spent would not be recoverable.162 The 
Supreme Court, however, sided with the Sixth Circuit Court of 
                                                 
 154. Id. at 194-95. 
 155. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.). 
 156. Id. § 7, 87 Stat. at 892 (forbidding actions that resulted in the 
“destruction . . . of habitat of [endangered] species which is determined by the 
Secretary . . . to be critical”). 
 157. The snail darter was a “previously unknown species of perch.” Hill, 437 
U.S. at 158.  
 158. Hill, 437 U.S. at 159, 161-62 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 159. Id. at 160, 162. 
 160. Id. at 164 (noting that in 1975, two years after the ESA had passed, 
Congress appropriated an additional $29 million toward the Tellico Dam project). 
 161. Id. (“[R]espondents filed the case now under review, seeking to enjoin 
completion of the dam and impoundment of the reservoir on the ground that those 
actions would violate the Act by directly causing the extinction of the 
species . . . .”). 
 162. Hill v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 419 F. Supp. 753, 755, 759-60 (E.D. Tenn. 
1976). 
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Appeals and overruled the district court.163 Similar to In re Aiken 
County, the Court acknowledged that Congress’s continued 
appropriations conflicted with prior legislation passed by 
Congress.164 While the district court relied on congressional 
appropriations as evidence of Congress’s intent to complete the 
construction of the Tellico Dam in spite of the ESA,165 the Supreme 
Court held that the Appropriations Act did not implicitly repeal the 
ESA due to the presumption against implied repeals.166  
The Court stated that the presumption against implied repeals 
applies with even greater force when the subsequent legislation is an 
appropriations act for several reasons. First, when voting on 
appropriations measures, legislators vote under the assumption that 
the funds will be used for lawful purposes.167 Second, the Court noted 
that there was no evidence suggesting all members of Congress were 
aware of Tennessee Valley Authority’s desire to continue 
construction of the Tellico Dam in spite of the ESA.168 Lastly, the 
Court found that the Appropriations Committee’s views represented 
only the views of the Committee members themselves, and not the 
legislative intent of Congress as a whole.169 
                                                 
 163. See Hill v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 549 F.2d 1064, 1075 (6th Cir. 1977) 
(ordering an injunction on the building of Tellico Dam until Congress, through 
explicit legislation, exempted the Tellico Dam from compliance with the ESA).  
 164. Hill, 437 U.S. at 172-73. The Court also noted that Congress was likely 
aware that appropriating additional funding toward the Tellico Dam was in violation 
of the ESA, stating: 
It may seem curious to some that the survival of a relatively small number 
of three-inch fish among all the countless millions of species extant would 
require the permanent halting of a virtually completed dam for which 
Congress has expended more than $100 million. The paradox is not 
minimized by the fact that Congress continued to appropriate large sums 
of public money for the project, even after congressional Appropriations 
Committees were apprised of its apparent impact upon the survival of the 
snail darter. 
Id. at 172. 
 165. Hill, 419 F. Supp. at 761-62 (“[W]e believe that additional funding of 
the Tellico Project and a House Committee’s direction to complete the project . . . is 
persuasive that such an interpretation of the Act is consistent with congressional 
intent.”). 
 166. Hill, 437 U.S. at 189. The Court referenced the “cardinal rule . . . that 
repeals by implication are not favored” and stated that the presumption against 
implied repeals applies with even greater force when the later legislation is an 
appropriations act. Id. at 189-90 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 167. Id. at 190. 
 168. Id. at 192. 
 169. Id. at 193. 
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In a second case, Calloway v. District of Columbia, a rider in 
the District of Columbia Appropriations Act placed caps on the 
hourly rate and total compensation the District was able to pay 
prevailing attorneys in actions against D.C. Public Schools under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.170 Before the 
Appropriations Act was enacted, several families with disabled 
children filed suit, arguing that the limitation of attorney’s fees in the 
appropriations act conflicts with the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act’s guarantee that parents of disabled children have a 
right to competent counsel if public schools do not comply with the 
Act.171 The issue boiled down to whether, given the presumption that 
appropriations acts do not amend substantive law, Congress 
unambiguously expressed the intent to limit the courts’ authority to 
award fees.172 The court recognized the “potential incongruity of 
courts’ awarding fees that the [Appropriations Act] prohibits the 
District from paying during the same fiscal year.”173 Following 
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,174 however, the court gave narrow 
effect to the Appropriations Act175 and stated that it did not implicitly 
repeal portions of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.176  
Criticisms of the appropriations process—that appropriations 
only have an effect on the upcoming fiscal year and that the 
                                                 
 170. 216 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2000). It is wise to look to the D.C. Circuit for 
case law on this issue as it is widely held to be the premier authority on 
administrative and agency law. See Eric M. Fraser et al., The Jurisdiction of the D.C. 
Circuit, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 131 (2013) (stating that the Circuit’s 
caseload is “disproportionally weighted toward administrative law”). Further, the 
D.C. Circuit is the controlling circuit in In re Aiken County. Aiken Cnty. III, 725 
F.3d 255 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 171. Calloway, 216 F.3d at 5. The Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act guarantees that parents of disabled children will have the opportunity to 
participate in the identification, evaluation, and placement process of their children’s 
public education options. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1) (2012). Parents who object to the 
identification, evaluation, or educational placement are entitled to an “impartial due 
process hearing.” Id. § 1415(f)(1)(A). At the due process hearing, the parents have 
the right to be “accompanied and advised by counsel.” Id. § 1415(h)(1). 
 172. Calloway, 216 F.3d at 9. 
 173. Id. at 10.  
 174. 437 U.S. at 190. 
 175. See Calloway, 216 F.3d at 9 (“As we have elsewhere observed, ‘the 
established rule [is] that, when appropriations measures arguably conflict with the 
underlying authorizing legislation, their effect must be construed narrowly. Such 
measures have the limited and specific purpose of providing funds for authorized 
programs.’” (quoting Donovan v. Carolina Stalite Co., 734 F.2d 1547, 1558 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984))).  
 176. Id. at 10. 
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appropriations process is hurried and opaque—have merit in certain 
cases.177 In many cases, an appropriations act does not send a clear 
signal of congressional intent to repeal prior legislation, and in these 
situations, the presumption against implied repeals should apply to 
appropriations measures.178 As seen in In re Aiken County,179 
Tennessee Valley Authority,180 and Calloway,181 vigorously applying 
the presumption against implied repeals to appropriations acts can at 
times lead to nonsensical results, but on rare occasions, courts have 
allowed common sense to prevail.182 
B. Overcoming the Odds: Beating the Presumption Against Implied 
Repeals 
While Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill shows just how 
difficult it can be, the presumption against implied repeals has been 
overcome before.183 Significantly, the presumption against implied 
repeals was overcome in the 1973 case of Friends of the Earth v. 
Armstrong.184 In this case, the Tenth Circuit found that an 
appropriations act repealed an earlier statute even though the 
appropriations act did not directly contradict the prior statute or 
explicitly state its intention to repeal the prior statute.185 This case 
represented the first time that a federal court found that an 
appropriations act implicitly repealed a prior statute that did not 
require the expenditure of money.186  
                                                 
 177. See discussion infra Section II.B. 
 178. See generally Hill, 437 U.S. 153; Calloway, 216 F.3d 1. 
 179. Aiken Cnty. III, 725 F.3d 255, 269 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Garland, J., 
dissenting) (stating that the presumption against implied repeals, as applied to this 
case, forces the court to do a “useless” thing (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 180. Hill, 437 U.S. at 172-73 (acknowledging that it is “curious” that the 
snail darter could cause the permanent halting of an almost completed dam). 
 181. See Calloway, 216 F.3d at 10 (noting that the holding resulted in 
“potential incongruity”). 
 182. See discussion infra Section II.B. 
 183. See Petroski, supra note 24, at 532-40 (providing a detailed list of cases 
involving the presumption against implied repeals). Past cases in which implied 
repeals have occurred span from Society for Propagation of Gospel in Foreign Parts 
v. Town of Pawlet, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 480 (1830) to United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 
(1980). Id. 
 184. 485 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1973). 
 185. Id. at 7. 
 186. Environmental Law—Statutory Construction—Appropriations Act 
Repeals by Implication a Prior Substantive Enactment, 54 B.U. L. REV. 457, 458 
(1974) [hereinafter Environmental Law]; Armstrong, 485 F.2d at 9 (“This case at 
396 Michigan State Law Review  2015:371 
The Armstrong litigation occurred after water from Lake 
Powell entered the Rainbow Bridge National Monument 
(Monument) in 1971.187 Plaintiffs argued that the Colorado River 
Storage Project Act of 1956 (CRSPA)188 required the Secretary of the 
Interior to take action—either by erecting a barrier dam or by 
operating the current dam at less-than-full capacity—to prevent 
water impounded in Lake Powell from spreading into the 
Monument.189 The Secretary, however, pointed to subsequent 
appropriations actions by Congress that reduced funding toward the 
protection of the Monument, arguing that these actions implicitly 
repealed the portion of the CRSPA requiring the Secretary to take 
actions preventing water from spreading into the Monument.190  
The district court, using the common argument that implicit 
repeals are by nature disfavored, ruled in favor of Plaintiffs, 
effectively requiring the Secretary to take actions preventing any 
future water impounded in Lake Powell from entering the 
Monument.191 The court of appeals, however, reversed the district 
court’s decision after finding that the CRSPA had been implicitly 
repealed by the appropriations acts.192 The court believed that when 
considering the appropriations provisos in light of their legislative 
history, there was clear congressional intent to implicitly repeal the 
prior legislation.193 
                                                                                                       
issue here is significant, and different, however, from the cited cases, in that it does 
not involve a money provision in both statutes.”). 
 187. Armstrong, 485 F.2d at 3. 
 188. Pub. L. No. 87-483, 76 Stat. 96 (1962) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 620 
(2012)). The Act explicitly stated that “the Secretary of the Interior shall take 
adequate protective measures to preclude impairment of the Rainbow Bridge 
National Monument” and “that no dam or reservoir constructed under the 
authorization of this chapter shall be within any national park or monument.” Id. 
§§ 620, 620b. 
 189. Environmental Law, supra note 186, at 460.  
 190. Id. 
 191. Friends of the Earth v. Armstrong, 360 F. Supp. 165, 194 (D. Utah 
1973) (“Section 3 of the Colorado River Storage Project Act of 1956 (43 U.S.C. 
§ 620b) . . . forbids the intrusion of waters from Lake Powell and the Glen Canyon 
unit into the Rainbow Bridge National Monument . . . .”). 
 192. Armstrong, 485 F.2d at 8-9. 
 193. Id. at 9 (“Appropriation acts are just as effective a way to legislate as 
are ordinary bills relating to a particular subject. . . . In the case before us . . . the 
committee reports describe the considerations examined and evaluated by Congress 
and the reasons for the action taken. . . . This ‘repeal,’ if it should be called that, thus 
was straightforward, direct, and after hearings on the subject.”).  
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In a more recent decision, Last Best Beef, LLC v. Dudas, the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Congress’s ability to 
amend substantive legislation through appropriations riders, as long 
as its intent to do so is clear.194 From 2001 to 2004, Last Best Beef 
filed eight applications with the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office to trademark the phrase “The Last Best Place.”195 The Lanham 
Act provided that, with few exceptions, “[n]o trademark . . . shall be 
refused registration on the principal register on account of its 
nature.”196 In November 2005, however, President George W. Bush 
signed the Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act of 2006 (Appropriations Act), prohibiting federal 
funds from being “used to register, issue, transfer, or enforce any 
trademark of the phrase ‘Last Best Place.’”197 
In 2006, Last Best Beef filed a complaint arguing that the 
Appropriations Act “improperly circumvented the Lanham Act.”198 
The district court granted Last Best Beef summary judgment, stating 
that the Appropriations Act was “invalid legislation” and that it 
circumvented the Lanham Act when it insisted “any trademark for 
the phrase ‘Last Best Place’ be refused registration.”199 The district 
court relied heavily on the presumption against implied repeals when 
making its finding.200 
The Fourth Circuit, however, overturned the district court, 
stating that “[w]hile the canon of statutory interpretation disfavoring 
implied repeals in appropriations bills is strong, . . . [i]t is not an 
absolute rule.”201 The court noted that unlike Tennessee Valley 
Authority v. Hill,202 here, Congress clearly expressed its intention to 
repeal the Lanham Act due to the irreconcilable conflict between it 
and the Appropriations Act.203 The Appropriations Act prevented, “in 
                                                 
 194. See Last Best Beef, LLC v. Dudas, 506 F.3d 333, 335 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 195. Id. at 336. 
 196. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2006). 
 197. Pub. L. No. 109-108, § 206, 119 Stat. 2290, 2315 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1841 (Supp. III 2010)). 
 198. Dudas, 506 F.3d at 337. 
 199. Last Best Beef, LLC v. Dudas, 455 F. Supp. 2d 496, 499, 500 (E.D. Va. 
2006). 
 200. Id. at 499 (“‘Congress is not supposed to use appropriations measures as 
vehicles for the amendment of general laws.’” (quoting Strawser v. Atkins, 290 F.3d 
720, 733 (4th Cir. 2002))). 
 201. Dudas, 506 F.3d at 338. 
 202. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). In Hill, the language of the appropriations act did 
not explicitly require the completion of the Tellico Dam. Id. at 189.  
 203. Dudas, 506 F.3d at 339.  
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absolute contradiction with the Lanham Act, one phrase from being 
trademarked.”204 To hold otherwise and declare the Appropriations 
Act invalid would result in a per se rule that appropriations riders 
cannot amend earlier legislation, and the Fourth Circuit refused to 
make such a finding.205 Given that courts have recognized that the 
presumption against implied repeals is not an absolute rule even 
when the subsequent statute is an appropriations act,206 it is important 
to look at the different ways that courts analyze agency delays to 
determine the level of deference that an agency should be given 
when it interprets an appropriations act as implicitly repealing prior 
legislation and acts on this interpretation.207 
III. AGENCY DELAYS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Depending on the nature of and reason for the inaction, courts 
give agencies varying degrees of deference when reviewing a 
conscious decision not to act.208 In the case of In re Aiken County, 
however, rather than treating the NRC’s decision to not spend the 
remaining $11.1 million in funding as an agency delay, the court 
required the NRC to immediately comply with the statute and spend 
the remaining funds.209 For the reasons set forth below, when an 
agency fails to act due to a lack of appropriations, a better approach 
is to give the agency’s decision a greater degree of deference.210  
A. Judicial Review of Agency Inaction 
Currently, confusion in the circuit courts exists regarding 
judicial review of agency inaction.211 In Heckler v. Chaney,212 “the 
                                                 
 204. Id.  
 205. Id. at 340. 
 206. Id. at 338. 
 207. See discussion infra Part III. 
 208. See Lehner, supra note 18, at 670 (“The intensity of regulatory 
oversight varies widely among the statutory schemes that govern administrative 
agencies.”). 
 209. Aiken Cnty. III, 725 F.3d 255, 267 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“[U]nless and until 
Congress authoritatively says otherwise or there are no appropriated funds 
remaining, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission must promptly continue with the 
legally mandated licensing process.”). 
 210. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 211. See Biber, supra note 18, at 466-67 (discussing the “confused aspects to 
the doctrine of judicial review of agency inaction”). 
 212. 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
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most important Supreme Court case to find non-reviewability under 
[APA] § 701(a),”213 the Court held that there is a presumption against 
judicial review of agency inaction when agencies decide not to 
institute enforcement proceedings against a party.214 The Court noted 
that agencies’ decisions not to enforce statutory violations involve 
balancing numerous factors that are within the agencies’ expertise 
and that agencies are often in a better position than the Court to 
determine how best to allocate their resources.215 As stated by 
Professor Michael Sant’Ambrogio, post-Heckler, “the Court has 
expanded the category of agency decisions shielded from judicial 
review because they are committed to agency discretion to include 
agency refusals to grant reconsideration of an action, agency 
employment termination decisions, and agency allocation of lump-
sum appropriations.”216  
Still, in other situations, the Court treats agency inaction 
differently.217 For instance, in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court held 
that when agencies are deciding whether to engage in rulemaking, 
the Heckler presumption against judicial review of agency inaction 
does not apply.218 Importantly, the Court has never indicated that the 
Heckler presumption against reviewability applies to agency 
delays.219 
                                                 
 213. Biber, supra note 18, at 485. 
 214. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 838 (“The general exception to reviewability 
provided by §701(a)(2) for action committed to agency discretion remains a narrow 
one, but within that exception are included agency refusals to institute investigative 
or enforcement proceedings . . . .” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). 
 215. Id. at 831. For instance, the agency must assess not only if a violation 
has occurred, but also “whether agency resources are best spent on this violation or 
another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particular 
enforcement action requested best fits the agency’s overall policies, and, indeed, 
whether the agency has enough resources to undertake the action at all.” Id. 
 216. Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 21, at 1407 (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted). 
 217. See Lehner, supra note 18, at 669 (noting that the degree of deference 
“will depend upon the underlying configuration of the statute and other indications 
of policy preferences as well as upon the characteristics and past conduct of the 
challenged agency”). 
 218. 549 U.S. 497, 527-28 (2007). 
 219. Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 21, at 1410 (“In contrast to its decisions 
with respect to some types of agency inaction, the Court has never suggested that 
agency delays as a category are not reviewable.”).  
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B. Judicial Review of Agency Delays 
While the Court has never indicated that the Heckler 
presumption against reviewability applies to agency delays, it has 
done little else to clarify the subject. The Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA) mandates that “within a reasonable time, each agency 
shall proceed to conclude a matter presented to it.”220 The APA also 
states that reviewing courts shall “compel agency action unlawfully 
withheld or unreasonably delayed.”221 The Court has never provided 
guidance on what a “reasonable time” is or when an agency’s action 
is “unreasonably delayed.”222 Usually, courts will avoid answering 
these questions when the organic statute does not provide a deadline 
for agency action.223  
When the organic statute does contain a statutory deadline, 
some courts, including the In re Aiken County court, compel agency 
action regardless of the circumstances.224 Other courts, however, use 
a statutory deadline as just one factor to consider when determining 
whether an agency delay is reasonable.225 The trend among these 
courts is to review agency delays in both rulemaking and 
adjudications using the “TRAC” analysis,226 which is a six-factor test 
developed by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.227 The factors to be 
considered under the TRAC analysis include (1) whether the time 
that the agency takes to make decisions is governed by a rule of 
reason; (2) whether the statute supplies content for the rule of reason 
if Congress provides a timetable or indication of the speed that the 
agency is expected to proceed in the organic statute; (3) whether 
                                                 
 220. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (emphasis added). 
 221. Id. § 706(1) (emphasis added).  
 222. Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 21, at 1411. 
 223. DANIEL T. SHEDD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43013, ADMINISTRATIVE 
AGENCIES AND CLAIMS OF UNREASONABLE DELAY: ANALYSIS OF COURT TREATMENT 
3 (2013) (“When there is no statutory deadline for the agency action, courts tend to 
be more deferential to the agency’s priorities.”). 
 224. Id. at Summary (“Some courts have determined that a court has no 
choice but to compel agency action in the face of a missed statutory deadline. For 
these courts, no balancing is permitted when a deadline has been violated.”). 
 225. Id. (“However, other courts note that a statutory deadline is merely one 
of the factors to consider when determining whether the delay is unreasonable.”).  
 226. Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 21, at 1411 (“The most common approach 
used by the lower federal courts to review delays in both rulemaking proceedings 
and adjudications is the ‘TRAC analysis’ . . . .”). 
 227. Id. (describing the TRAC analysis as “a multi-factor test that the D.C. 
Circuit stitched together from prior caselaw in Telecommunications Research & 
Action Center v. FCC”). 
 The Yucca Two-Step 401 
human health and welfare are at stake, making the agency delay 
more reasonable; (4) the effect that expediting delayed action will 
have on agency activities of a higher or competing priority; and (5) 
the nature and extent of interests prejudiced by the delay.228 The court 
made sure to note that the sixth factor, whether any impropriety on 
behalf of the agency caused the delay, does not have to be present for 
a court to find a delay unreasonable.229 
The six factors listed in the TRAC analysis are certainly a good 
starting point for determining when an agency’s delay is reasonable, 
but the analysis is not without its flaws.230 For instance, it fails to take 
into account whether the reason for the agency’s delay was 
legitimate, whether the statutory mandate was specific or broad, and 
whether the decision imposes obligations on the agency in the face of 
limited resources or substantive action.231 Given the lack of clarity in 
applying the TRAC factors, courts are able to reach a variety of 
conclusions that best suit their wishes.232 Importantly, the TRAC 
analysis was developed for a situation that assumes a firm 
congressional commitment to the activity in question.233 Therefore, in 
situations when congressional intent is not entirely clear, such as In 
re Aiken County, the TRAC analysis is a less than ideal test to use to 
determine whether an agency delay is unreasonable.234  
C. Judicial Review of Agency Action Under the Chevron Two-Step 
While judicial review of agency inaction is complex and often 
criticized,235 courts have much more guidance when reviewing an 
agency’s decision to act based on its interpretation of a statute.236 
                                                 
 228. TRAC v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 229. Id. 
 230. Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 21, at 1413.  
 231. Id. at 1414. 
 232. Id. at 1413-14 (noting that “courts weigh the individual harm caused by 
the delay against the burden on the agency, with inconsistent results”).  
 233. TRAC, 750 F.2d at 79 (acknowledging that a “clear legislative 
preference” existed).  
 234. See id. While a clear legislative preference existed in TRAC v. FCC, 
750 F.2d at 79, the lack of congressional appropriations in Aiken County III, 725 
F.3d 255, 258 (D.C. Cir. 2013), makes the legislative preference much less clear. 
 235. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An 
Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1658 (2004) (“[T]he law 
governing judicial review of agency inaction has elicited criticism for decades.”). 
 236. See Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-
Interest, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 203, 204 (2004) (“When a party aggrieved 
by a federal government agency’s interpretation of a statute or regulation seeks 
402 Michigan State Law Review  2015:371 
There is perhaps no more famous administrative law case than that of 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.237 
Under what has been described as the “Chevron Two-Step,”238 
federal courts frequently defer to agency expertise when reviewing 
statutes that apply to agencies.239 The first part of the Chevron Two-
Step requires courts to enforce congressional intent if “Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”240 If Congress has 
not spoken to the precise question at issue, however, then courts 
must defer to the agency’s interpretation of the statute as long as that 
interpretation is reasonable.241  
The decision in Chevron has been described as embodying a 
“very powerful pro-agency bias.”242 In many instances, however, a 
“pro-agency bias” may not be an entirely bad thing, as the agency is 
better equipped to make a decision than the court is.243 First, agencies 
are designed to be experts in their assigned field, whereas judges are 
widely regarded as generalists.244 Therefore, as the Court in Chevron 
acknowledged, when a matter falls within the agency’s expertise, the 
agency is in a better position to make a decision.245 Second, while 
                                                                                                       
judicial review, the reviewing court typically applies the Chevron doctrine . . . .” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 237. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). In fact, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc. is “the most cited case in modern public law.” Thomas J. 
Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical 
Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 823 (2006).  
 238. Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271, 1278 
(2008). 
 239. Id.  
 240. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
 241. Id. at 843. 
 242. Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism 
in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1619 (2006). 
 243. See David S. Rubenstein, Putting the Immigration Rule of Lenity in Its 
Proper Place: A Tool of Last Resort After Chevron, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 479, 497 
(2007) (“[A]gencies generally have better information and more expertise than . . . 
the Judiciary . . . .”). 
 244. See Chad M. Oldfather, Judging, Expertise, and the Rule of Law, 89 
WASH. U. L. REV. 847, 848 (2012) (“[T]he iconic American judge remains a 
generalist. She sits on a court of general jurisdiction and adjudicates whatever 
disputes happen to come before her.”); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure 
and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. 
REV. 612, 680-81 (1996) (stating that federal courts should provide greater deference 
to agencies given their expertise and experience). 
 245. 467 U.S. at 866 (“When a challenge . . . really centers on the wisdom of 
the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left 
open by Congress, the challenge must fail.”). 
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courts are bound by precedent, agencies have more flexibility when 
making decisions.246 Third, while Supreme Court Justices and many 
other judges across the country have life terms, agency heads are 
politically accountable to the electorate by way of the Executive 
branch.247  
While much has been written about the Chevron Two-Step, 
there has been relatively little scholarship published examining the 
scope of the Chevron decision.248 As the years have passed, however, 
the Supreme Court has been confronted with numerous cases 
concerning the reach of Chevron’s scope.249 Slowly, the scope of 
Chevron has expanded into territories not initially imagined by the 
Court.250 The case of Chevron itself involved an interpretation of an 
environmental law statute.251 Beginning in 1985, the Chevron Two-
Step began to appear in other environmental law cases, and it 
eventually spread to other areas of law.252 Today, Chevron has 
                                                 
 246. See Jonathan Masur, Judicial Deference and the Credibility of Agency 
Commitments, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1021, 1025 (2007) (noting the “Supreme Court’s 
trend . . . towards providing agencies with ever greater temporal flexibility”). For an 
argument that agency flexibility has been diminished by the recent case of Alaska 
Professional Hunters Ass’n v. Federal Aviation Administration, 177 F.3d 1030 
(D.C. Cir. 1999), see Matthew P. Downer, Note, Tentative Interpretations: The 
Abracadabra of Administrative Rulemaking and the End of Alaska Hunters, 67 
VAND. L. REV. 875, 891-92 (2014). 
 247. Bradley Lipton, Note, Accountability, Deference, and the Skidmore 
Doctrine, 119 YALE L.J. 2096, 2096 (2010) (“[A]gencies are more politically 
accountable than courts.”). 
 248. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 833, 835 (2001) (“Little effort [by the courts] has been made to spell out 
what . . . sorts of agency interpretations qualify for Chevron deference once an 
agency has been so charged. Academic commentators, with a few important 
exceptions, have also had little to say on the subject.” (footnote omitted)). 
 249. See Christensen v. Harris Cnty, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000); FDA v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000); I.N.S. v. Aguirre-
Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999); United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 
380, 392-93 (1999). 
 250. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 248, at 838. 
 251. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
840 (1984). The Court decided to defer to the EPA’s expertise when determining 
whether, under the Clean Air Act, a “‘stationary source’” referred to an individual 
smoke stack or an entire industrial plant. Id. at 840, 865-66. 
 252. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 248, at 838-39; United States v. 
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985) (applying Chevron to 
environmental statutes); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 
U.S. 116, 125 (1985) (same); Holly Farms Corp. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 517 
U.S. 392, 398 (1996) (applying Chevron in a labor law context); Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. Comm’r, 523 U.S. 382, 387 (1998) (applying Chevron in a tax law context). 
404 Michigan State Law Review  2015:371 
appeared in so many different areas of law that it has been described 
to be “as ubiquitous as if Congress had written it into the APA.”253 
Given that Chevron deference has expanded into so many different 
areas of the law, a strong argument can be made that a modified 
version of the analysis is also appropriate when analyzing agency 
interpretations of appropriations acts.254 
IV. THE YUCCA TWO-STEP 
While it is far from becoming a trend, multiple circuit courts 
have used appropriations acts to implicitly repeal prior statutes, 
finding that the acts provided clear congressional intent to repeal the 
prior legislation.255 An unsolved problem remains, however: How can 
the courts be confident of congressional intent when looking solely 
at an appropriations act, and if they are not confident in 
congressional intent, then should they immediately compel agency 
action? Prior case law has not applied the Chevron Two-Step in an 
attempt to answer these questions.256 In order to find answers, while 
still acknowledging that in most cases it will be difficult to determine 
intent, courts should adopt a two-prong test, inspired by the Chevron 
Two-Step, that will eliminate the illogical conclusions that courts 
have felt obligated to find in cases such as In re Aiken County, 
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, and Calloway v. District of 
Columbia.257 
                                                 
 253. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 248, at 839. 
 254. See discussion infra Part IV. There is a slight distinction between the 
Chevron Two-Step and the issue in In re Aiken County. In Chevron, the Court was 
deferring to an agency’s interpretation of a statute. 467 U.S. at 866. However, in 
Aiken County III, the issue revolved around an agency’s interpretation of an 
appropriations act. 725 F.3d 255, 259-60 (D.C. Cir. 2013). For reasons that will be 
discussed in Part IV, the Chevron Two-Step still provides a solid framework for 
determining whether an agency’s delay due to lack of appropriations is reasonable. 
See discussion infra Part IV. 
 255. See Friends of the Earth v. Armstrong, 485 F.2d 1, 7 (10th Cir. 1973); 
Last Beef, LLC v. Dudas, 506 F.3d 333, 335-36 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 256. See generally Aiken Cnty. III, 725 F.3d 255 (not applying Chevron 
deference to an agency delay caused by a lack of appropriations); Tenn. Valley 
Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (same); Calloway v. District of Columbia, 216 
F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (same). 
 257. See discussion supra Subsection II.A.2. 
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A. Step One: Finding Clear Congressional Intent in Appropriations 
Acts 
The first inquiry of this proposed test requires the use of 
common sense. This step requires courts to first look at the text of 
the prior statute and subsequent appropriations act.258 If the two acts 
are in direct conflict, the inquiry ends immediately and the 
appropriations act governs.259 However, going against established 
principles, even if the two acts are not in direct conflict, courts may 
still find that the subsequent appropriations act implicitly repeals the 
prior statute if the amount of funds appropriated “shocks the 
conscience.”260 
1. Finding Intent Through Textualism 
If the appropriations act and the prior legislation are in direct 
conflict, or, put differently, “clearly repugnant as to vital matters,”261 
then the inquiry ends here, and the appropriations act governs. 
Similar to the current approach used when determining whether 
subsequent legislation implicitly repeals prior legislation, courts 
should look to the plain language of both the appropriations act and 
prior substantive legislation to see if there is a direct conflict.262 This 
preliminary step allows for the result that occurred in Last Beef, LLC 
v. Dudas, where the Fourth Circuit held that “‘[w]here Congress 
chooses to amend substantive law in an appropriations rider, we are 
bound to follow Congress’s last word on the matter even in an 
appropriations law.’”263 This step is similar to the first inquiry in the 
Chevron doctrine analysis: whether Congress has spoken precisely to 
the issue at hand.264 However, unlike the Chevron Two-Step, and 
perhaps more controversial, step one of this test proposes that in 
certain cases, actions can speak louder than words when determining 
                                                 
 258. See discussion infra Subsection IV.A.1. 
 259. See discussion infra Subsection IV.A.1. 
 260. See discussion infra Subsection IV.A.2. 
 261. See SINGER & SINGER, supra note 115, § 23:10. 
 262. Id. (stating that “[t]he presumption against implied repeals is 
overcome . . . by a showing that two acts are irreconcilable, clearly repugnant as to 
vital matters to which they relate, and so inconsistent that they cannot have 
concurrent operation”). 
 263. 506 F.3d 333, 339 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Strawser v. Atkins, 290 F3d 
720, 734 (4th Cir. 2002)).  
 264. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842-43 (1984). 
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if Congress clearly intended for the appropriations act to repeal the 
prior legislation.265  
2. Beyond the Text: The “Shocks-the-Conscience” Standard 
While the text of a statute is typically the best place to look for 
congressional intent, it is difficult to discern true congressional intent 
by mere text alone.266 In order to avoid absurd results,267 the first step 
of this test proposes that in addition to the text, courts should also 
look at the amount of money that either has been appropriated or not 
appropriated to a specific project to determine whether congressional 
intent is clear. Because it is difficult to place a precise numerical 
value on appropriations expenditures that will signal clear intent,268 
courts should look to constitutional law principles and adopt a 
“shocks-the-conscience” standard at step one.269 If the amount of 
appropriations shocks the conscience, courts may find that the 
subsequent appropriations act implicitly repeals the prior statute.  
                                                 
 265. See discussion infra Subsection IV.A.2.  
 266. John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 
2389-90 (2003) (“Congress does not always accurately reduce its intentions to 
words because legislators necessarily draft statutes within the constraints of bounded 
foresight, limited resources, and imperfect language.”). 
 267. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 202-05 (1978) (Powell, J., 
dissenting). Here, Justice Powell raised a strong argument that to construe the 
appropriations act and the substantive legislation in the manner that the majority 
violated the statutory canon against absurdity. Id. Since the beginning, the Supreme 
Court has allowed that judges may deviate from statutory text when a specific 
application of it produces an absurd result. Manning, supra note 266, at 2388. 
“[S]tandard interpretive doctrine . . . defines an ‘absurd result’ as an outcome so 
contrary to perceived social values that Congress could not have ‘intended’ it.” Id. at 
2390. The absurdity doctrine allows a court to find that the statutory text may differ 
from the legislature’s true intent. Id.  
 268. See Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 170 (7th Cir. 1996). In 
Hoctor, Judge Richard Posner argued that a rule that is determined based on a 
number is likely to be arbitrary. Id. For example, when a lower court ruled that a 
fence had to be eight feet high to provide secure containment for animals, he stated, 
“[t]here is no way to reason to an eight-foot perimeter-fence rule as opposed to a 
seven-and-a-half foot fence or a nine-foot fence or a ten-foot fence. None of these 
candidates for a rule is uniquely appropriate to, and in that sense derivable from, the 
duty of secure containment.” Id. The same argument could be made in this context if 
a precise numerical value determined congressional intent: for instance, if the rule is 
that $1,000,000 in appropriations signals clear congressional intent, why not 
$990,000?  
 269. See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1998). 
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The Supreme Court introduced the shocks-the-conscience test 
in Rochin v. California.270 Because this standard does not have set 
criteria to determine what exactly shocks the conscience, criticism of 
the test has emerged.271 There is concern that this standard could 
provide for judicial overreaching without the need for explanation.272 
In County of Sacramento v. Lewis, however, the Supreme Court used 
the shocks-the-conscience standard differently than the Rochin 
Court.273 Rather than allowing judges to make decisions based off of 
their emotions, the standard was used as a threshold step that 
precluded further action in regard to the claim unless “‘the behavior 
of the governmental officer [was] so egregious, so outrageous, that it 
may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.’”274 When 
determining whether congressional intent to repeal prior legislation 
with an appropriations act is clear, courts should follow the approach 
used in Lewis.275 
Given that it will be difficult to discern congressional intent 
based solely on an appropriations act,276 that courts have shown a 
clear preference for explicit rather than implicit repeals of prior 
statutes,277 and that the presumption against implied repeals has been 
said to apply “with even greater force” when it rests solely on an 
appropriations act,278 as a policy matter, it makes sense to set the bar 
high when determining whether an appropriations act was meant to 
implicitly repeal a prior statute.279 As courts must consider a 
                                                 
 270. 342 U.S. 165, 172-74 (1952) (adopting a shocks-the-conscience test to 
determine when substantive due process rights are violated). 
 271. See Robert Chesney, Old Wine or New? The Shocks-the-Conscience 
Standard and the Distinction Between Legislative and Executive Action, 50 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 981, 991-92 (2000) (noting the objection that the shocks-the-
conscience test could simply boil down to “whether the trier of fact finds the 
challenged action particularly objectionable, without indicating what standards, if 
any, the trier of fact is to consider in making that determination”). 
 272. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 865 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that by using a 
shocks-the-conscience test, judges are engaging “not [in] judicial review but judicial 
governance”). 
 273. Chesney, supra note 271, at 992. 
 274. Id. at 993 (emphasis added) (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847 n.8 
(majority opinion)). 
 275. 523 U.S. 833.  
 276. See discussion supra Section II.A. 
 277. See McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 25, at 688. 
 278. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978) (italics omitted).  
 279. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 865 (Scalia, J., concurring). If it were easy for 
judges to find that Congress meant to implicitly repeal prior legislation, the type of 
judicial overreaching that Justice Scalia was concerned about in County of 
Sacramento v. Lewis could come to fruition. Id. 
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multitude of factors when determining whether Congress intended to 
implicitly repeal prior legislation,280 assigning a specific dollar 
amount that signals clear congressional intent makes little sense.281 
Because the shocks-the-conscience test sets the bar high for judges to 
determine that Congress intended to repeal prior legislation,282 yet 
does not require a precise numerical amount to determine when this 
occurs, it is an ideal fit in this context.  
While most situations will not pass the shocks-the-conscience 
threshold, requiring this test at step one forces judges to at least 
consider whether Congress meant to implicitly repeal prior 
legislation when it passed an appropriations act.283 In the case of In re 
Aiken County, the lack of appropriations would likely not be enough 
to pass the shocks-the-conscience threshold and implicitly repeal the 
prior substantive legislation.284 Political pressure is the primary 
reason that funding toward Yucca Mountain has ceased in recent 
years, and when a new Congress comes in, it could decide to begin 
appropriating funds toward Yucca Mountain again.285 While a 
plausible argument can be made that it was Congress’s intent to 
repeal the prior legislation,286 the point of the shocks-the-conscience 
                                                 
 280. See McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 25, at 691-94 (discussing 
“what constitutes the appropriate measure of adequate legislative deliberation” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). While the amount of money appropriated is 
certainly a telling factor as to congressional intent, other factors, such as amounts 
appropriated in previous years, total appropriations budgets, and whether a new 
Congress would vote differently on the appropriations, must all be taken into 
consideration. Id.  
 281. See discussion supra note 268 and accompanying text. 
 282. See Matthew D. Umhofer, Confusing Pursuits: Sacramento v. Lewis 
and the Future of Substantive Due Process in the Executive Setting, 41 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 437, 475 (2001) (“[A] criticism of the shocks the conscience test is 
that it is simply too strict a test. . . . Under the shocks the conscience test, only the 
most extreme and egregious conduct will be sufficient to trigger the protections of 
the Due Process Clause.”). 
 283. As Matthew D. McCubbins and Daniel B. Rodriguez discussed, the 
concerns about finding congressional intent through an appropriations act may not 
be as serious as some scholars have suggested. McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 
25, at 695-97. Given the discussion by McCubbins and Rodriguez, it is important 
that courts at least consider whether Congress meant to implicitly repeal prior 
legislation, and the shocks-the-conscious test achieves this goal. Id. 
 284. Aiken Cnty. III, 725 F.3d 255, 259-60 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 285. See Easley, supra note 44, at 673 (noting that while President George 
W. Bush supported the funding, President Obama vowed that he would “end the 
notion of Yucca Mountain” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 286. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (noting that appropriations 
toward Yucca Mountain declined from $572 million to $0). 
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test’s high threshold is that congressional intent must be absolutely 
clear. When congressional intent is less than perfectly clear, a better 
approach is to determine whether the delay is reasonable rather than 
immediately compelling action or permanently repealing a prior 
statute.287 
B. Step Two: When Is Agency Action Reasonable? 
The difficulty of finding clear congressional intent, particularly 
through an appropriations act, can be seen in the first prong of the 
“Yucca Two-Step.”288 In In re Aiken County, an argument could be 
made that Congress’s dwindling appropriations toward the Yucca 
Mountain licensing application, through numbers alone, signaled 
clear congressional intent that Yucca Mountain was no longer a 
viable option for the country’s nuclear waste repository.289 Given the 
low probability that a court will find clear congressional intent to 
repeal prior legislation through an appropriations act alone,290 
however, the second step of this test—whether an agency’s action is 
reasonable291— becomes much more important.292 
In the case of In re Aiken County, the NRC failed to take 
statutorily mandated action.293 The NRC was not arguing that it 
would never take the statutorily mandated action, but rather that it 
would not take the action at that particular time due to the lack of 
appropriated funds.294 Therefore, the question at step two of this 
                                                 
 287. See discussion infra Section IV.B. 
 288. See discussion supra Section IV.A. 
 289. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (noting that the congressional 
budget that once set aside $572 million for research relating to Yucca Mountain 
dwindled to $0 by 2011). 
 290. See discussion supra Section II.A. 
 291. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 843 (1984). When Congress has not directly spoken to the precise question at 
issue, “the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.” Id. 
 292. See Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of 
the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 31 (1998) 
(showing that when the court decides the issue at step one, the agency’s behavior is 
upheld 42% of the time, while when the court decides the issue at step two, the 
agency’s behavior is upheld 89% of the time). 
 293. See discussion supra Part II. The statutory mandate required the NRC to 
act on the DOE’s license application to store nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain. 
Aiken Cnty. II, No. 11-1271, 2012 WL 3140360, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 3, 2012) 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring).  
 294. See discussion supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
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analysis becomes, “under what circumstances is an agency delay due 
to appropriations, or the lack thereof, reasonable?” Lower federal 
courts typically look to the TRAC analysis to determine whether 
agency delay is reasonable.295 Because the TRAC analysis 
presupposes a firm congressional commitment to the activity in 
question, however, in cases where congressional intent is not entirely 
clear, the TRAC analysis provides little guidance.296 Therefore, 
courts should consider a new, three-prong balancing test when 
assessing whether an agency delay due to lack of appropriations is 
reasonable: (1) whether a legitimate reason for the agency delay 
exists; (2) the additional benefits of an agency delay; and (3) the 
additional costs of an agency delay.297 
1. Legitimacy of Agency Delays: A Burden Shifting Approach 
One of the problems with the original TRAC analysis is that it 
does not distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate causes of 
agency delay.298 As a threshold matter, the agency should bear the 
burden of proving that there is a legitimate reason for its inaction.299 
                                                 
 295. Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 21, at 1411. 
 296. See discussion supra note 233 and accompanying text. 
 297. See discussion infra Subsection IV.B.1. In a recent article, Bret Kupfer 
also analyzed whether a more sensible outcome was possible in In re Aiken County. 
Kupfer, supra note 9, at 331. Kupfer proposed a four-factor test to determine when 
an agency, due to a lack of appropriations, should not be required to follow a 
statutory mandate: 
(1) whether general appropriated funds may be used to fulfill the statutory 
duty; (2) whether Congress is unlikely to appropriate sufficient funds in 
the future that would render spending the remaining funds beneficial to 
fulfilling the statutory mandate; (3) whether starting and stopping actions 
to address the statutory mandate creates added costs; and (4) whether 
mandamus would negatively implicate the agency’s other duties. 
Id. at 359. Kupfer’s article, however, fails to address the possibility that the 
presumption against implied repeals can be overcome solely through an 
appropriations act, prohibiting the outcome of cases such as Last Beef, LLC v. 
Dudas, 506 F.3d 333, 335-36 (4th Cir. 2007) and Friends of the Earth v. Armstrong, 
485 F.2d 1, 9-10 (10th Cir. 1973), where the courts held that appropriations acts 
signaled clear congressional intent to repeal prior legislation. Judicial efficiency will 
result from looking to the presumption against implied repeals and including a first 
step to attempt to find clear congressional intent before getting into a multifactor test 
to determine whether agency action is reasonable.  
 298. Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 21, at 1414. 
 299. A burden shifting approach has been seen in several different areas of 
the law. For example, in Title VII disparate treatment claims, the “McDonnell 
Douglas burden-shifting framework” first requires an employer to state a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. 14A C.J.S. Civil 
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Once this hurdle is cleared, the challenger would have to show that, 
given the remaining factors discussed below, and by a preponderance 
of the evidence, the agency delay is still unreasonable.300 In In re 
Aiken County, the NRC would have little difficulty demonstrating 
that a legitimate reason existed for its delay in spending the 
remaining $11.1 million, as the court acknowledged that this amount 
was “wholly insufficient to complete the processing of the 
application.”301 The Supreme Court itself has acknowledged that in 
the face of insufficient funds, agencies are better equipped than 
courts to determine the best uses for the limited funding,302 and 
therefore, unless the remaining two factors303 suggest otherwise, the 
NRC’s delay should be deemed reasonable. 
2. Additional Benefits of Limited Agency Action 
Additional benefits may exist that justify allowing an agency 
delay. It is important to consider whether “[t]he next administration 
will benefit from [any] work if [the present administration] decides 
to proceed with regulation in the area.”304 Given that the agency is in 
a much better position than the court to determine whether the 
money would be put toward a productive use,305 if the agency in good 
faith306 believes that spending the remaining funds would not be 
                                                                                                       
Rights § 215 (2013). The burden is then shifted to the plaintiff that the defendant’s 
reason was just pretext for discrimination, through a preponderance of the evidence. 
Id. 
 300. See discussion infra Subsection IV.B.2. 
 301. Aiken Cnty. III, 725 F.3d 255, 269 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Garland, J., 
dissenting). 
 302. Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 193 (1993) (stating that agencies are 
“‘far better equipped than the courts to deal with the many variables involved in the 
proper ordering of its priorities’” (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 
(1985))). 
 303. See discussion infra Subsections IV.B.2-3. 
 304. Michael Sant’Ambrogio, The Extra-Legislative Veto, 102 GEO. L.J. 351, 
406 (2014). 
 305. See Oldfather, supra note 244, at 848 (“[T]he iconic American judge 
remains a generalist. She sits on a court of general jurisdiction and adjudicates 
whatever disputes happen to come before her.”); Manning, supra note 244, at 680-
81 (stating that federal courts should provide greater deference to agencies given 
their expertise and experience). No judge would know the benefit of utilizing the 
$11.1 million in remaining funds better than the NRC would. See Manning, supra 
note 244, at 680-81. 
 306. See discussion supra Subsection IV.B.1. A good faith requirement is 
necessary in situations such as In re Aiken County due to the political controversy 
surrounding the issue. See discussion supra Subsection IV.B.1.  
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beneficial, then the court should yield to the agency unless a 
challenger can demonstrate the benefit.307 In the case of In re Aiken 
County, it was not disputed that the $11.1 million in remaining funds 
was insufficient to complete the licensing process.308 The D.C. 
Circuit, however, found it important that some funding remained to 
conduct the licensing process.309 The majority, however, failed to 
consider whether any benefit would come from spending the 
remaining funds.310 
In In re Aiken County, one can think of several possible 
benefits that could result from using the $11.1 million in funding 
toward Yucca Mountain. For example, the money could be spent to 
research storage methods for future sites or to assess the best 
transportation methods for moving nuclear waste from one location 
to another. Unlike in Tennessee Valley Authority where construction 
of the Tellico Dam had never halted,311 in In re Aiken County, the 
NRC had shut down “the licensing program, dismantled the 
computer system upon which it depended, shipped the documents to 
storage, and reassigned the program’s personnel to projects that did 
have congressional funding.”312 The NRC stated that a significant 
part of the $11.1 million in remaining funds would be spent simply 
getting all of the materials back in place.313 Unless the challengers to 
this action could demonstrate that some tangible benefit would result 
from the NRC spending the money, the D.C. Circuit should respect 
the NRC’s decision to withhold spending. 
3. Additional Costs of Compelling Immediate Agency Action 
To balance out any additional benefits that limited agency 
action may have, courts should also consider any additional costs—
outside of spending the funds alone—that limited agency action may 
                                                 
 307. Due to the burden-shifting approach of the Yucca Two-Step, at the 
second step, the challenger has the burden of demonstrating the benefits of spending 
the remaining funds. See discussion supra Subsection IV.B.1. 
 308. Aiken Cnty. III, 725 F.3d 255, 269 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Garland, J., 
dissenting). 
 309. Id. at 258 (majority opinion).  
 310. Id. at 269 (Garland, J., dissenting) (stating that “granting the writ in this 
case will indeed direct the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to do ‘a useless thing’”). 
 311. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 157-58 (1978). 
 312. Aiken Cnty. III, 725 F.3d at 270. 
 313. Id. 
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have.314 Agency delays can cause multiple problems affecting more 
than just the intended beneficiaries of the agency action.315 These 
delays can “impose unintended costs on intended beneficiaries and 
unintended benefits on those intended to bear the costs of 
regulation.”316 Further, the longer that it takes for an agency to decide 
on a specific course of action, the more inefficient the agency 
becomes, as resources that could be spent taking action are instead 
wasted reviewing old findings and training new personnel.317  
In In re Aiken County, the Petitioners who are living near 
nuclear waste that should be stored at Yucca Mountain are bearing 
unintended costs.318 While Petitioners are bearing unintended costs, 
these costs would not be remedied by compelling the NRC to spend 
the remaining $11.1 million to continue working on the licensing 
process.319 At this stage of the test, the court would have to consider 
what other consequences would arise by forcing the NRC to spend 
the $11.1 million.320 By forcing the NRC to spend valuable time and 
money completing the licensing process for Yucca Mountain, a site 
that by all indications will never be used as the country’s nuclear 
waste repository, the country will make no progress toward finding a 
viable alternative to Yucca Mountain, and the Petitioners will be 
stuck with the nuclear waste in their backyards for an even longer 
period of time. 
CONCLUSION 
Currently, the courts are applying a one-size-fits-all test when 
reviewing agency delays based on a lack of appropriations.321 No 
                                                 
 314. Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 21, at 1399 (“The failure by agencies to 
implement statutory mandates obstructs the bestowal of economic and social goods 
on intended beneficiaries of legislative action.”). 
 315. Id. at 1400. 
 316. Id. at 1399. 
 317. Id. at 1401-02. 
 318. See discussion supra Part II. The reason that Petitioners brought suit in 
the first place is because the nuclear waste that was supposed to be stored at Yucca 
Mountain was stored near their homes and workplaces. See discussion supra Part II. 
 319. See discussion supra Subsection IV.A.2. 
 320. See Kupfer, supra note 9, at 362 (arguing that minimal consequences 
would result from ordering the NRC to spend the remaining funds because “the 
NWPA required all appropriations from the Waste Fund to be used for a nuclear 
repository and Yucca Mountain is the only possible site”). 
 321. See generally Aiken Cnty. III, 725 F.3d 255 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (applying 
the presumption against implied repeals as a hard-and-fast rule); Calloway v. 
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matter how little funding is left, or how useless spending the 
remaining funds will be, courts are still compelling agency action.322 
A large reason for this is that courts are hesitant to go against the 
well-established presumption against implied repeals, especially 
when the subsequent statute is an appropriations act.323 While there 
are certainly good reasons that the presumption against implied 
repeals exists, it also clouds courts’ ability to see the entire picture.324  
To fix these problems and avoid nonsensical judgments, courts 
should adopt the Yucca Two-Step.325 The first step of this test 
requires courts to consider congressional intent.326 While it is rare 
that an appropriations act will clearly demonstrate congressional 
intent to repeal prior substantive law, it may happen more often than 
one may think, and it is important to at least consider the 
possibility.327 The second step of this test looks to determine whether 
the agency delay was reasonable.328 Because the TRAC analysis 
presupposes a firm congressional commitment to the activity in 
question, a modified approach is used to determine whether an 
agency delay is reasonable in this context.329 As a threshold matter, 
the agency must prove that there is a legitimate reason for its 
delay.330 The burden then shifts to the challenger to prove that 
additional benefits will result from limited agency action.331 Courts 
must also consider any additional consequences of the agency’s 
delay.332 By taking a common sense approach and giving agencies a 
greater degree of deference, courts will not feel compelled to order 





                                                                                                       
District of Columbia, 216 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (same); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. 
Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (same). 
 322. Aiken Cnty. III, 725 F.3d at 269-70 (Garland, J., dissenting). 
 323. See discussion supra Part II. 
 324. See discussion supra Section II.A. 
 325. See discussion supra Part IV. 
 326. See discussion supra Subsection IV.A.1. 
 327. See generally McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 25, at 686-89. 
 328. See discussion supra Subsection IV.B.2. 
 329. See discussion supra Section III.A. 
 330. See discussion supra Section IV.A. 
 331. See discussion supra Section IV.B. 
 332. See discussion supra Section IV.B. 
 333. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
